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The Biological Essence of Law 
Summary 
 
Law, this paper contends, is in essence an evolutionary phenomenon that can, and indeed 
should, be studied in the light of biological mechanisms. One could see law as an extended 
phenotype of underlying genes. In addition, legal systems will be congruous to genetic 
mechanisms. Properties of genes have impact on legal systems in a fractal like manner. In this 
way, it is not surprising that notions of stability, replication and reciprocity that are important 
in biological systems, as well will be important in human legal systems. Legal systems 
therefore will be constructed in a way that it is congruent with genetic advantage of the group 
members. Law, exposure and punishment can diminish deviant behaviour to restore balance. 
Law will not particularly be subject to natural selection, but it certainly will be build on the 




Remark: This manuscript has not yet been edited. Please ignore mistakes in English language 
at this point. 
 






Law, this paper contends, is in essence an evolutionary phenomenon that can, 
and indeed should, be studied in the light of biological mechanisms. In 
addition, evolutionary biology is one of the perspectives that can increase our 
understanding of the principles of law. This position is at odds with what 
Leiter and Weisberg are saying: ‘Evolutionary biology offers nothing to law – 
more precisely, it offers nothing to help with questions about legal regulation 
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of behaviour.’1 Many jurists will agree. I think they are mistaken. To be sure, 
we should be careful in applying biological mechanisms to legal subjects, yet 
we may more fully grasp the nature of law by bringing the two disciplines 
together. Certainly, it can be dangerous to translate biological facts from 
experiments on animals in normative arguments about how people should 
behave; recent scientific history abounds in examples of how easy it is to draw 
wrong conclusions.2 It is currently also difficult to use evolutionary biology to 
determine which legal incentives should be used to regulate behaviour, not 
least because we do not exactly know to what end we should regulate 
behaviour. However, these caveats do not imply that law cannot be seen as a 
kind of extended phenotype that can be studied with aid of biological 
mechanisms.3 With the right genes, an organism can build a shelter, thereby 
improving not only its survival chances but also the replication chances of its 
genes.4 It is reasonable to assume that law systems in a congruent way are a 
consequence of this property of genes to create stable, extended phenotypes. 
From this perspective, the building blocks of law systems are the same as the 
building blocks of physical phenotypes.  
Genes are stable molecules that can replicate and spread over a population. 
They flourish in stable systems such as cells, complex organisms and 
societies. The stability of genetic molecules and the potential stability of such 
features of human civilizations as religion, nationalism and law can mutually 
reinforce each other.5  
                                                 
1 B. Leiter and M. Weisberg, ‘Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant to Legal Regulation’, Law and 
Philosophy 12 May 2009. 
2 We should always remember the ideas of Sir Francis Galton who was the father of study of the possibility of 
improving the qualities of a human population by discouraging reproduction by persons having genetic 
deviations, the eugenetics. Galton, F., Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development. London: Macmillan 
1883.  The era in which these ideas came into practice has ended not so long ago. Adolf Hitler even incorporated 
these ideas in Mein Kampf and eugenetics in a sense was legitimating the holocaust. 
3 Richard Dawkins developed the extended phenotype concept in his eponymous 1983 book. 
4 R. Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983. 
5 E.g., R. Vaas and M. Blume, Gott, Gene und Gehirn, Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag 2009. 
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Not that law systems are subject to natural selection, but because they have 
grown on the foundations of natural selection, they will inherently will be in 
line with genetic mechanisms. In this way, law systems can be to the benefit 
of groups, individuals and indeed underlying genes. The metaphor of a 
building is perhaps enlightening. Imagine, we have the foundation of an 
ancient Roman temple. An architect gets the assignment to build a modern 
building on top of this foundation. The new building will probably have a new 
appearance, but the building will have the same measures and will be not 
much higher than the original temple. The building will also protect the 
ancient foundation and will cause it to survive longer. 
We know that there are many social systems in the nonhuman world where 
rules, rule following, punishment for rule breaking, and even third party 
punishment are to be found. The forming of a law system therefore, is not 
unique. One could see law as an extended phenotype of underlying genes. 
Then, it is not surprising that notions of stability and reciprocity that are 
important in biological systems, as well will be important in human legal 
systems. Stability, replication and reciprocity are important at the gene level. 
They are also important at the legal level. Legal systems therefore will be 
constructed in a way that it is congruent with genetic advantage of the group 
members. I will argue that the basis of legal systems can be found at the level 
of genes. I will describe some important characteristics of genes. In addition, I 
will formulate seven Provisional Laws in order to clarify the relation of 
genetics and law. In this way, it should be possible to formulate some basic 
universals of human law systems. At the same time, I will try to deal with 
some apparent antinomies in the current theories on evolution of culture, and 
therefore of law. I will do this by introducing fractal theory.  
 
The gene as fractal generator 
 
All human systems and constructs ultimately go back to those stable, 
replicating molecules we call genes. Without genes there is no DNA, without 
DNA no RNA, without RNA no proteins, without proteins no organs, without 
organs no humans, without humans no human traits and behaviour, without 
behaviour no uniquely human institutions such as religion, nationalism and 
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law.6 In essence, it is simple as that. Genes are a sine qua non for human 
behaviour. Not one sine qua non, but the most important sine qua non, 
although replicating molecules cannot replicate without external factors. They 
need a medium to prosper; they need molecules as ‘food’ to replicate.  
 
Perhaps, this point can be clarified by introducing fractal theory. Fractals are 
objects of which the smallest particles have the same structure as the 
composition of these particles.7 The so-called Cantor set is probably the 
simplest fractal. A line can be divided in two lines, each of these lines can be 
split in two new lines. The result is many short lines with gaps between them. 
The macrostructure resembles the microstructure.8  
The Swedish mathematician developed the Koch curve, filling the gaps in a 
straight line with new, equally angled lines in a repetitive process. With every 
step more ‘bulges’ are added. The initial, straight line is called the initiator, 
the repeating action the generator.9  
Fractals can also be recognized in the coast of Great-Britain, which 
superficially shows only big coves. More detailed charts show smaller coves. 
The number of coves increases with the degree of detail. This is an example of 
a scaling relationship.10 Note that nowhere are the coves  identical, but the 
structure – the principle, the plan – is the same. The coast evolved in a 
situation where the environment was not as homogenous as the piece of paper 
on which computer drawings are made. A fractal’s environment will influence 
its eventual form. 
Fractals manifest themselves in apparent chaos by random processes. Because 
of the generator, ordered structures will appear in chaos. The pattern of many 
natural structures – a snowflake, leaves, cell growth, lungs, our brain – 
approximates a fractal. Chaos combined with a generator will yield very 
                                                 
6 See F. Crick’s quote in: E. Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000, p. 
54. 
7 L.S. Liebovitch, Fractals and Chaos, New York: Oxford University Press 1998. 
8 N. Lesmoir-Gordon,W. Rood and R. Edney, ‘Introducing Fractal Geometry, Cambridge: Icon Books 2000, p. 
20-21. 
9 P.M. Iannaccone & M. Khokha, Fractal Geometry in Biological Systems. An Analytical Approach, Boca Raton: 
CRC Press 1995, p. 5. 
10 L.S. Liebovitch, Fractals and Chaos, New York: Oxford University Press 1998, p. 108. 
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complex yet ordered structures that repeat themselves.11 Henri Poincaré 
showed that even complex behaviour ultimately consists of simple patterns 
that can be described with simple mathematic models.12  
 
Many natural processes are random events that are structured by a generator. 
The result is a fractal.13 These fractals are not as exact as mathematical 
models, but they do have a statistic self-similarity.14 For instance, our lungs 
have one fractal dimension for the first seven generations and other 
dimensions in the bronchi.15 It is likely that these structures are shaped by a 
genetically coded generator.16 The gene prescribes the generator. In this way, 
a relatively low number of genes may suffice to account for a very complex 
body.17 This idea is confirmed by the growth of different types of bacterial 
colonies. Bacteria only have about 1,000 genes, but their colonies have very 
complex fractal structures. The shape of the colony of different types of 
bacteria is also different. Genes determine the pattern of the colony, but the 
shape also depends on external factors. If other bacteria are encountered, the 
structure of the colony will change at the point of contact and some genes will 
be switched off.18 In this way, a limited number of genes can cause very 
complex behavioural patterns to evolve.19 Even at the gene level, cooperation 
is important. By working together, genes can produce more sophisticated and 
mutually beneficial structures. 
The dependent gene 
Thanks to fractal theory, we know that two genes could suffice to explain the 
form of leaves in plants. And knowing that, it is not so difficult to imagine 
how 1,000 genes can create different fractal patterns that make cells grow. 
Genes that are stable can spread. A gene on its own, however, will face 
                                                 
11 Lesmoir-Gorden, Rood & Edney 2000, supra note 7, p. 43-44. 
12 Ibid., p. 50. 
13 Lesmoir-Gorden, Rood & Edney 2000, supra note 7, p. 63. 
14 Liebovitch 1998, supra note 9, p. 12. 
15 Lesmoir-Gorden, Rood & Edney 2000, supra note 7, p. 108. 
16 M. F. Barnsley, J.E. Hutchinson & Ö. Stenflo, ‘Variable Fractals and Superfractals’, Australian National 
University 2004. 
17 Liebovitch 1998, supra note 9, p. 24. 
18 T. Matsuyama & M. Matsushita, Morphogenesis by Bacterial Cells, in: Iannaccone & Khokha 1996, supra 
note 8, p. 127-129. 
19 Ibid., p. 151-155; M. Khokha & P.M. Iannaccone, ‘Mosaic Pattern in Tissues from Chimeras’ in: Iannaccone 
& Khokha 1996, supra note 8, p. 195 -198, 201. 
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serious difficulties trying to replicate and spread. It has to encounter the right 
molecules that are necessary for replication. The combination of a gene that 
generates a flagella and a gene that generates a device to capture the right 
molecules helps both genes spread faster. Selection will therefore be to the 
benefit of the gene combination. Nonetheless, the capture-device gene has to 
share the captured molecules with the flagella gene. Only if they find twice 
the number of molecules the separated ancestors needed, will the combination 
be successful.20 Is the capture-device gene altruistic, because it shares its food 
with the flagella gene? Well, not exactly. Sharing is a necessity to find 
additional food. Without sharing, the flagella gene will not replicate and the 
capture-device gene will soon be isolated. It will probably be ‘eaten’ by a 
stable gene combination in which the capture-device gene does share. Is the 
not-sharing gene selfish? Well, no. It will not succeed and will be food for the 
cooperating gene combination. Genes are not altruistic, nor are they selfish: 
they depend on each other. Sometimes the cooperation of two genes is 
successful. In the same way, the cooperation of 1,000 genes can be successful. 
Such notions as egoism or altruism are not relevant on the level of genes. 
Genes generate fractals and sometimes the combination of two fractal patterns 
makes the underlying cooperating gene generators replicate faster. It is a 
matter of reciprocity. 
Fractals are found on all biological levels: in molecules, in cells, in tissues, in 
organs and in organisms.21 In addition, these structures also create fractal 
movements, as the beating of the heart,22 respiration23 and even the behaviour 
of crowds. Crowds behave in the same way as a complex organism.24 
Variation in biological processes is not random, but evolves in accordance 
with fractal theory. In a way, nature is deterministic, because a few simple 
mechanisms determine how processes will develop. Nevertheless, in the long 
term biological processes are unpredictable, because small disturbances in the 
environment can cause major alterations.25 One could say nature is a 
                                                 
20 See also W.D. Hamilton, ‘The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior’, American Naturalist 1963, p. 354-356. 
21 Iannaccone & Khokha 1996, supra note 8, p. 10. 
22 Lesmoir-Gorden, Rood & Edney 2000, supra note 7, p. 120. 
23 Liebovitch 1998, supra note 9, p. 23. 
24 Lesmoir-Gorden, Rood & Edney 2000, supra note 7, p. 130; C. Brown & L. Liebovitch, Fractal Analysis, 
London: Sage Publications 2010, p. 51-63. 
25 Liebovitch 1998, supra note 9, p. 162. 
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deterministic chaos.26 No two ferns will be alike, yet they all have the same 
structure. 
Let us assume that not only genes contain codes that work as a generator, but 
that some properties of genes – like stability, reproduction, need for nutrients, 
reciprocity and growth - act as generators for fractal patterns as well. In both 
cases, the environment acts as initiator. The fractal pattern can then be 
recognized in cells, organisms, groups and even states. If this is true, some 
simple but strong characteristics can be recognized on all levels. For the 
fractal structure to exist, it is essential that all levels are stable, that food is 
available and that replication takes place. 
Thus, the mechanisms on a gene level can be recognized on the level of cells, 
organisms and groups. Multilevel selection will affect the spreading of 
genes.27 When a gene mutates and this causes the organism to lose, for 
example, its flagella, then this combination will not survive. When a cell does 
not find food, this will be lethal to its generating genes. When an organism 
gets ill before it has reproduced the underlying genes will vanish. All kinds of 
selection on many levels are possible, but the mechanism is the same. 
Organisms are dependent to each other. An organism that does not cooperate 
with group members, where others do and punish free riders, will spread its 
genes less then an organism that cooperates within such a group. Groups that 
cooperate will be stronger then groups that do not. The non-cooperating 
groups probably will vanish.  
Fractal gene theory acknowledges multilevel selection theory. However, 
fractal theory also shows that not all structures are the result of selection. 
Selection is the force that will eventually destroy structures that cannot 
maintain themselves. In the mean time, genes will produce all kind of forms. 
These forms not necessarily contribute to the fitness of the individual or the 
group. Nevertheless, genes that produce stable forms will exist for millions of 
years. Therefore, structures are created by people are build on genetic 
foundations that were successful for a very long time. In other words, the 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 164. 
27 See also E. Sober & D.S. Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998, p. 88. 
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appearance of different structures may differ, the building blocks, the basic 
principles on which they are build are the same. 
 
Cooperation is important for genes to spread. Systems that improve 
cooperation between dependent units will therefore flourish also. In theory, it 
is possible that there is law outside the human realm, in a non-material world. 
In fact, it looks as if most people think there is. Shariff and Norenzayan 
showed that when such normative words as ‘justice’ and ‘treaty’ are used in 
the famous Dictator game in experimental economics,28 people will share 
significantly more of their money than when only neutral words are used, just 
as when such religious words as ‘God’ and ‘Holy’ are used. Law is 
unconsciously regarded as being more authoritative than everyday facts.29 It 
looks like even atheists unconsciously consider law to be at the same level of 
authority as religion. However, this dualistic vision lies outside the scope of 
science, which tries to comprehend our world without metaphysical 
explanations. We have no knowledge of law that exists in a metaphysical 
world, so the most logical conclusion has to be that law finds its cause in 
nature. Religious systems, as well as law systems, improve cooperation and 
will probably improve the spreading of underlying, dependent genes. More 
important is that law would not exist without the existence of genes as 
generators. Although this conclusion does not warrant reducing law to the 
properties of genes, genes as generators are an important factor in the genesis 
of law and therefore in the characteristics of law. This can be restated as the 
First Law of Evolutionary Genetics and Human Law:  
 
Stable, replicating molecules are fractal generators that create life forms and 
their behaviour. Their characteristics are therefore essential to human law as 
an inherently biological behaviour-regulation system.  
                                                 
28 In the Dictator game players get a certain amount of money of which they can voluntary give some to other 
players. Homo economicus should hold everything for him. However, most players will share some with there 
fellow players. 
29 A.F. Shariff & A. Norenzayan, ‘God Is Watching You’, Psychological Science 2007, p. 803-809; See also 
J.M. Bering, ‘The Folk Psychology of Souls’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2006, p. 453-462. 
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Proteins as mediators 
 
Genes do not produce a trait or behaviour. First RNA and proteins have to be 
produced. When combined with other proteins, these proteins can be 
responsible for the production of cells and eventually other physical structures 
such as arms, legs, eyes and a brain. Proteins are also necessary for the 
production of hormones and neurotransmitters. Without genes as generators in 
an environment of molecules (initiator), there will be no brain, let alone a 
functioning one. By themselves, genes cannot make a brain. The genes inter 
react and the environment influences the inter reactions. The VMAT2 gene is 
a good example of how genes can be mistakenly seen to be responsible for a 
trait. Hamer calls it ‘the God gene’ because it would make people believe in 
God. Dawkins adds to the confusion by using such terms as ‘the selfish gene’ 
and ‘replicator’. These names suggest that genes are self-centred, have 
vehicles that are designed to replicate genes or can directly produce certain 
behaviour. Of course, none of this is true. The VMAT2 gene codes a protein, a 
monoamine transporter. It can conserve monoamines like adrenalin, 
noradrenalin, dopamine and serotonin and release these neurotransmitters 
when a nerve cell fires. Genes are dependent and cooperate. Proteins can be 
considered means to make exchanges possible. Depending on the 
circumstances, these neurotransmitters can produce either depression or 
ecstatic feelings. They can make the border between the ‘I’ and the ‘not-I’ 
become diffuse, which some would call a spiritual experience. The VMAT2 
gene has two variants, one with adenine, and the other with cytosine in 
identical positions. Individuals with cytosine were, according to Hamer’s 
results, more spiritual than people with adenine. Hamer’s conclusion was that 
there is a gene that makes people believe there is a God.30 However, as 
Zimmer wrote, it is much more complicated. The VMAT2 gene only produces 
a transporter for various neurotransmitters. The VMAT2C gene perhaps 
releases the neurotransmitters earlier and in that way contributes to spiritual 
feelings in a broad sense.31 By focussing to one gene, we overlook the 
                                                 
30 D. Hamer, The God Gene, New York 2004. See also supra note 5. 
31 C. Zimmer, ‘Faith-Boosting Genes’, Scientific American 2004, p. 77-78. 
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importance of cooperation and exchange on the molecular level. One gene is 
nothing; thousand genes make a cell – together. Genes that ‘contribute’ will 
survive; genes that do not can be missed. Reciprocity is necessary to keep the 
system stable. 
 
Three important things can be learned from this example. First, genes as 
generators are necessary for particular behaviour, but how that behaviour 
manifests itself also depends on other proteins and chemical substances that 
react with the proteins as a consequence of environmental factors. Generators 
can also influence each other, thus creating new forms. Second, genes have to 
cooperate and need reciprocal relations to produce sophisticated systems. 
Before a person can conclude he is ‘one with nature’ or that ‘nature is God’, 
there have to have been many inter reactions. Genes are necessary for a 
spiritual God-experience to occur at all, but one gene alone cannot produce 
that experience. Because of the context-dependent nature of the effect of 
genes on behaviour, it is impossible to calculate the consequences of any 
single gene.32 Third, one should be very careful to translate genetic facts into 
explanations for human behaviour. Without those facts, there will be no 
human behaviour, but from a chemical fact on the level of molecules, there 
will be a complex process in the human body before it comes to a certain 
behaviour or thought.  
This can be formulated as the Second Law of Evolutionary Genetics and 
Human Law:  
 
Genes only indirectly cause certain types of behaviour. Genes as generators 
are a precondition for law but do not produce law in a direct way. 
 
No determined behaviour, only predispositions 
 
Natural selection sometimes can ensure that a trait is represented. However, 
this ‘is no prima facie reason to think a trait which is adaptive in the earlier 
environment would manifest itself in the later one’.33 Leiter and Weisberg call 
                                                 
32 E. Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1982. 
33 Leiter and Weisberg 2009, supra note 1. 
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this principle the Environmental Gap Objection. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
production of proteins has different effects in different environments is not an 
‘objection’. Phenotypic variation as a consequence of environmental 
influences is one of the most fundamental principles in evolutionary 
explanations of human behaviour. It explains the fact that two persons with 
identical genes, monozygotic twins, will behave differently when raised 
separately.34 It explains why one of the two becomes a designer of cars and 
the other works in an aircraft factory. It explains why one of the two believes 
he is a child of God and the other is fascinated by the idea that his existence is 
possible because of stable, replicating molecules, so that he is ultimately one 
with Nature. It also explains why these separated twins continue to look very 
much alike, why their characters are so similar and why, in the same situation, 
they behave in very much the same way.  
 
The environmental gap explains why the same group of genes might make 
people in a small group believe in ancestors that live on as good or bad 
demons, while people in complex societies tend towards believing in one 
almighty god.35 Both groups of people believe - the fractal pattern is alike – 
but the environment influences the shape. The gap can also explain why 
people in small groups have strong systems of group morals where law 
systems evolve in complex societies. Smart rulers will use group morals and 
standards to make group members obey. They will expand the morals of their 
group to the society they lead as a whole. As Richerson and Boyd state, ‘[t]he 
symbolic unity of the early state may often have been as much the unity of the 
elite as the unity of society as a whole.’ The elite not only use morals and 
norms, but also an abstract system of religious beliefs to unite the people. 
Uniting various groups requires abstract rules and an abstract deity that unites 
                                                 
34 It can even explain how differences in the genetic makeup between twins derived from the same zygote can 
exist. The (chemical) environment has its effects as early as genes start to replicate or to produce proteins. E.g., 
C.E.G. Bruder, ‘Phenotypically Concordant and Discordant Monozygotic Twins Display Different DNA Copy-
Number-Variation Profiles’, The American Journal of Human Genetics 2008, p. 763-771. 
35 P. Boyer, Religion Explained, London: Vintage 2002; D.D.P. Johnson, ‘God’s Punishment and Public Goods’, 
Human Nature 2005, p. 410-466. 
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all other gods.36 The mightier groups will expand the morals of their group to 
the society they lead as a whole.37 It is bad to kill a group member, so it is bad 
to kill a member of society. It is bad to steal from your neighbour, so it is bad 
to steal from the king. It is good to help your brother, so it is good to help the 
government. Members of the dominant group initially parasitize on the 
subordinated groups, but as the groups dissolve and eventually form a society, 
they profit from the new order. The (fractal) pattern will be alike; however, 
more closely examined there are some differences. Genes generate the pattern; 
proteins and other environmental factors mediate and make differences in 
shape possible. Just like the structure of bacteria colony changes when other 
bacteria encounter, the behaviour can change in a different environment.38 
Nonetheless, by studying the gene as a generator important patterns in moral 
behaviour can be recognized. Moral systems, like law systems and religious 
systems, stabilize cooperating groups, so that group members and underlying 
genes can spread. If these systems in a group fail, the ‘group will dissolve and 
will be replaced by other groups with a more robust social system’.39  
One could argue cultural evolution takes place. Cultural evolution that not 
necessarily influences the spreading of underlying genes, because cultural 
evolution is a faster way to adapt to the environment. Still, the new culture 
that will evolve will have to be based on the same foundations as the older 
one. For example, the intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished, 
seems to be universal. The amount of agreement on relative blameworthiness 
is also very high.40 The most severe end and therefore the punishment 
continuum may differ. The average prison sentence In the Netherlands was in 
1998 five months, while offenders in Columbia were imprisoned for a mean 
                                                 
36 Dominic D.P. Johnson, ‘God’s Punishment and Public Goods’, Human Nature 2005, 410-466  
37 It is well known that Hinduism developed following the invasion of India by the Arians, who had much more 
sophisticated weapons than the indigenous population of India. This elite formulated the Rigveda, a holy book 
that gave them godly powers and described godly morals. 
38 Matsuyama and Matsushita 1996, supra note 20, p. 127-129. 
39 Sober and Wilson 1998, supra note 30, p. 173, p. 189. 
40 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, ‘Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice’, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 
2007, p. 1872. 
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of 140 months.41 The ranking of crimes however, does not differ. Emotions 
and preferences led to proto-moral and proto-legal systems.42 Evolution has in 
particular contributed to intuitions that condemn physical harm, sexual 
harassment, the taking of property and  cheating in exchanges.43 Because the 
most successful strategy is to cooperate selectively with other cooperators, 
one must be able to discern unfairness. Individuals that cheat, injure group 
members or take a free ride must be punished. A psychological system that is 
able to compute when someone is a free rider therefore will improve fitness. 
Shared intuitions of justice contribute to this ability, will tune sanctions within 
the group and thus will reduce the number of transgressions.44 In this way, 
cooperators will have the advantage. Retaliation and reward thus can be 
considered necessary in cooperating, reciprocal systems.45 More, according to 
Damasio, emotions are critical for moral choice. Moral convictions ‘require 
caring about others and powerful ‘gut feelings’ about right and wrong’.46 
Researchers of the Max Planck Institute found that chimpanzees retaliate 
immediately in cases of theft. One chimpanzee was given food. Then a second 
chimpanzee was placed in an opposite cage. The second chimpanzee could 
pull the food away from the first, so that he himself could eat from the food. 
When the second chimpanzee did this, the first began screaming. When given 
the first chimpanzee to pull a rope by which action all the food was spilled, he 
                                                 
41 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Seventh United Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems1998-2000, p. 66 and 308. 
42 E.g. Margereth Gruter & Roger D. Masters, ‘Ostracism: A Social and Biological Phenomenon’, Ehtology and 
Sociobiology 1986, p. 149-158; See also Hendrik Gommer, From the ‘Is’ to the ‘Ought’, ARSP 2011 (accepted 3 
January 2010, not yet published) 
43 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, ‘The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice’, 
Vanderbilt Law Review 2007, p. 1644-1646. 
44 Robinson, Kurzban & Jones 2007, supra note 46, p. 1646-1651. 
45 Frans B.M. de Waal, Good Natured; The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, 1996, p. 
157-159. 
46 A. Damasio, Descartes’Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, New York, Putnam 1994; Frans B.M. 
de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, how Morality Evolved, Princeton University Press: Princeton 2006, p. 18. 
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did this immediately, although neither of the two could benefit of the food 
anymore.47 This precocious view of morality also exists in ranking actions. 
Children consider physical harm more wrong than property violations and 
theft.48 Doing physical harm is a prototypical moral violation to them.49 
Cultural differences do not influence this, although convention may create 
different perceptions on what is harm and what is not.50 
Most of the characteristics of human (proto-)moral have been evolved by 
natural selection in the course of millions of years. These are the foundations 
on which law has to be build on, these are the building blocks that people will 
use when they will formulate new law. Cultural evolution may occur, but it 
will not take place outside these restrictions. No law system will be 
considered just that orders to kill all newborn infants or to rob people of all 
their property. Such a system will not be stable. 
 
Consequently, I would like to rephrase the ‘Environmental Gap Objection’ as 
the Third Law of Evolutionary Genetics and Human Law: 
 
Genes as generators will cause somewhat different fractal patterns in different 
environments. Therefore, law can have different appearances. Still, the 
properties of genes as generators will be the building blocks of the law. 
                                                 
47 K. Jensen, J. Call & M. Tomasello, ‘Chimpanzees are vengefull but not spiteful’, PNAS 2007, 13046-13050. 
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Transgressions: An Observational Study’, 7 Early Education & Devevelopment 1996, p. 137-139; Marie S. & 
Elliot Turiel, ‘Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Prudential Rules’, 55 Child Developmen, 1984, p. 1030-
1031. 
49 Marie S. Tisak & Jeanne H. Block, ‘Preschool Children’s Evolving Conceptions of Badness: A Longitudinal 
Study’, 1 Early Education and Development 1990, p. 305. 
50 Elliot Turiel, Melanie Killen & Charles C. Helwig, ‘Morality: Its Structure, Functions, and Vagaries’, in 
Jorome Kagan & Sharon Lamb eds., The Emergence of Morality in Young Children 1987, p. 155-170; Cecilia 
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An analogous example of this idea concerns the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR). 
Singh presented various sketches of underweight, normal weight and 
overweight women to male subjects. The males had a consistent preference 
for a WHR of 0.7.51 Another study found that men considered women with a 
body mass index (BMI) of 18-20 as most attractive. It was also demonstrated 
that women with such a BMI were healthier and more fertile.52 Nonetheless, 
there are cultures in which men prefer women with the highest WHR. The 
explanation offered by evolutionary psychologists is that the ancestral 
environment in such cultures was probably harsh. Women with a higher WHR 
would have higher fat storage and therefore have a better chance to survive 
and bear children. In other words, in such cultures too men chose the 
healthiest women.53 Genes do not produce behaviour; they are generators that 
will predispose people towards particular behaviour. The environment can 
alter the behaviour to a certain extent.54 
 
What genetical mechanisms can predict 
 
This brings us to the ‘Discovery Rationale’. According to Leiter and 
Weisberg, ‘we have to predict the traits that will occur from evolutionary 
considerations’.55 Working out the evolutionary origin of a trait is not enough. 
They rightly state that the interaction between genotype and environment is 
complex and non-linear. Even so, it has to be acknowledged that the details of 
this interaction are yet unknown. We have genes on one end of the scale, 
behaviour on the other, but the process linking them is still very opaque, and 
                                                 
51 D. Singh, ‘Adaptive Significance of Female Physical Attractiveness: Role of Waist-to-Hip Ratio’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 1993, p. 298; D. Singh, ‘Body Shape and Women’s Attractiveness: The 
Critical Role of Waist-to-Hip Ratio’, Human Nature 1993, p. 297-321. 
52 M.J. Tovée et al., ‘Optimum Body-Mass Index and Maximum Sexual Attractiveness’, Lancet 1998, p. 548. 
53 D.W. Yu and G.H. Shepard Jr., ‘Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder?’, Nature 1998, p. 321-322; J. Alcock, 
The Triumph of Sociobiology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. p. 141-143. 
54 John Alcock, The Triumph of Sociobiology, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 39. 
55 Leiter and Weisberg 2009, supra note 1. 
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evolutionary accounts are speculative. Be this as it may, genes as generators 
play an important role in how people behave and think. If this factor is 
ignored, the theory of behaviour will be neither complete nor sound. You can 
write a book about gymnastics without speaking of gravity, as Leiter and 
Weisberg state, but understanding gymnastics only is possible by studying 
gravity too. In addition, when you understand the effect of gravity on 
gymnastics you can use that knowledge to improve your skills. It will 
certainly work better than thinking that if your faith is strong, spirits can lift 
you into the air. Likewise, most books about law ignore the role of genes, but 
that does not mean knowledge of genes will not improve law. 
 
The remark about spirits lifting you into the air may seem oddly out of place 
or flippant, it is in fact how some people conceive of the workings of the law. 
Some theories say that law develops in society and that ‘therefore there is no 
biological theory possible’,56 society apparently being some kind of dualistic 
phenomenon that can exist without the physical brain of man.57 If you keep up 
the faith in that law, it will work in society. Still, accepting that law has 
foundations in our genes, necessitates looking at genetic mechanisms to fully 
understand it. Eventually such explanations will give better results in 
improving the law than if one keeps searching for a dualistic source of law in 
society. Biological contemplation of law implies a monistic mindset. Religion, 
nationalism, law, they all find their sine qua non in our genes. Genes are 
important as they act as generators in a chaotic environment. Without at least 
understanding basic properties of genes, we can never fully understand the 
phenomenon of law. It may yet be impossible to determine how genes 
combine with certain traits, but properties of genes can predict how people 
will tend to behave. 
 
Sociobiological theories of coercive sex will serve to illustrate my point. 
According to Thornhill and Palmer, rape was favoured by natural selection to 
                                                 
56 E.g., P.C. Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis, Leiden: Brill 1997, p. 
287-297. 
57 Emile Durkheim, Les Jugements de Valeur et les Jugements de Réalité, par. IV, 1911. 
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give sexually dispossessed males the chance to have children.58 This 
explanation has been criticized.59 Nonetheless, Jones states that ‘the better 
law’s model of human behaviour, the more efficiently it may be able to shape 
environmental conditions to shift behaviour in socially desirable ways’.60 I 
agree with Leiter and Weisberg that this is too big a step.61 By focussing on 
acts which are generally deemed reprehensible, such as rape, we are about to 
forget that what we find ‘socially desirable’ has biological causes too. During 
the war in Bosnia, the Serbs killed many Muslim men and Muslim women 
were routinely raped. It was ‘socially desirable’ for Serb soldiers to join their 
fellow soldiers in raping women. Without law and order, from a genetic point 
of view it can be profitable to rape women. This behaviour corresponds with 
the behaviour of male chimpanzees. When conquering new territories, they do 
not hesitate to kill other males to ‘appropriate’ females. If necessary, they will 
kill the newborns to restart the females’ reproductive cycles.62 Indeed, there 
could be in chimpanzees and humans an age-old connection between power 
and sex which may explain the inclination of men to rape women.63 Rape is 
not just an act of ‘sexually dispossessed males’, it is how some might treat 
women when these men are not kept in check by morals and fellow 
community members. A recent report on sexual victimization of women in the 
Netherlands states that 12% of all women have been raped at least once in 
their life. Most of them were raped between the ages of 15 and 34, 98.4% of 
the rapists were male, and only 26.8 % of the rapists were unknown to the 
victim.64 
 
                                                 
58 R. Thornhill and C. Palmer, A Natural History of Rape, MIT Press 2000, p. 30. 
59 E.g., E.A. Lloyd, ‘Science Gone Astray: Evolution and Rape’, Michigan Law Review 2001: 1536, 1546. 
60 O.D. Jones, ‘Law and the Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions’, Hastings Women’s Law Journal 2000, 
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61 Leiter and Weisberg 2009, supra note 1. 
62 A.E. Pusey, ‘Of Genes and Apes’, in: F.B.M. de Waal, Tree of Origin, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
2001, p. 9-38. 
63 F.B.M. de Waal, ‘Survival of the Rapist’, New York Times Book Review April 2, 2000. 
64 Rutgers Nisso Groep, Seksuele gezondheid in Nederland 2009 , www.rutgersnissogroep.nl, e.g. p. 93. 
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How do these figures fit in the genetic approach I have described above? 
There probably is no ‘rape gene’. From an evolutionary perspective, rape can 
be seen as following from the conflicting interests of men striving to spread 
their genes and of women aiming to bind their partners to them in order to 
protect their children. One of the reasons why we regard involuntary sex as 
rape is because it is not in the interest of spreading the genes of the victims. 
Their chances to have a protective partner and to have successful children will 
diminish. It is not socially desirable to be a rape victim, because it is more 
difficult to find a partner that will protect you when the child you are 
expecting is not his. It is not socially desirable to be a rapist, because other 
men and women will punish you, diminishing your chances of spreading your 
genes in future. This works differently in Bonobo groups. Bonobo females 
copulate with many males, because that behaviour stabilizes their society. 
Frequent copulation within Bonobo-groups will encourage the males to 
display the preferred behaviour; they will cooperate better and protect their 
females and offspring because it is not clear which male is the father of which 
young. Therefore, it is advantageous for females to use sex as a means of 
conciliation with males. In effect, females are dominant in the group.65 If 
bonobos would be able to create a law system, their law system would 
definitely have other characteristics. An article against rape, for example, 
would not occur in bonobo law. There would be no Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).66 
Human society generally does not work that way; it is mainly based on 
monogamous relationships. Men protect their female partners (and offspring) 
because protection ensures that they can be fairly certain the offspring is 
theirs. For women it pays to be picky and cautious in choosing a mate.67 
Women may therefore be naturally predisposed to caution and their aversion 
to forced sex is likely to be innate. On the other hand, most men probably 
                                                 
65 F.B.M. de Waal, ‘Apes from Venus’, in: F.B.M. de Waal, Tree of Origin, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 2001. 
66 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 
1979 by the UN General Assembly. 
67 Ibid. 
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have the genes that could incline them to use their power to have sex with 
unwilling women.68 For man the desire to mate is one of his strongest 
biological urges.69 It depends on their social position whether it is favourable 
to do so. If you are a sexually dispossessed man of low status, you will 
probably not think in terms of future chances.70 If you are a man of high 
power, you are likely to expect to escape sanctions; as a family member, you 
hope your transgression remains undetected;71 if you are a friend, you may 
well think your victim will not expose you.72 In a way, rapists are free riders. 
They challenge the rules of society, because they rely on being able to get 
away with it or because they have nothing to lose. If this is true, the only way 
to fight rape is for the perpetrators to be exposed and to be punished severely. 
The male unconscious, which is partly programmed to proliferate as 
effectively as possible, will react by avoiding violent sex against women. In 
line with Kitcher and Levy, it can be said that the goal of transforming society 
to the extent there is no rape is ‘likely forever out of reach’. The cost of rape 
to men has to be made prohibitively high.73 However, there will always be 
circumstances in which rapists can, or think they can, avoid the high costs.  
Nonetheless, for a group to flourish group members have to act in a reciprocal 
way. They contribute to the group so that they can profit of the benefits of 
group life. Alexander speaks of systems of indirect reciprocity. They involve 
social investment, which represents a short-term cost that may yield a long-
term benefit.74 These systems evolve ‘automatically’ within group moral 
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systems.75 Reciprocity itself can be considered a generator that causes stable 
patterns in a cooperating environment, where food is essential. If this system 
of reciprocity is disturbed, group members will (have to) take action to restore 
balance. Law will be formulated in line with these predispositions. A law that 
is in line with, evolutionary evolved, proto-moral will be considered just. 
Therefore, (proto-)moral can be recognized in all law systems. Not that law 
itself necessarily warrants the spreading of underlying genes. Still, it will have 
a structure that is congruent to evolutionary evolved proto-moral. Law will be 
build on the foundations of proto-moral and building blocks of human nature 
will be used to build the systems. 
 
The above allows us to formulate the Fourth Law of Evolutionary Genetics 
and Law. 
 
Law systems will evolve congruous to proto-moral that has been evolved by 
natural selection of genes. Thus, in law one will recognize characteristics that 
genes also have. 
 
A stable society as a consequence of stable, replicating molecules 
According to Keeley, 95% of the native Indian tribes were at war with each 
other, causing roughly 0.5 % of the population to die. Even the Twentieth 
Century state wars would have had a death-rate twenty times higher if the 
world's population were still organized into non state tribes. For example, at 
Crow Creek in South Dakota, ‘archaeologists found a mass grave containing 
the remains of more than 500 men, women and children, who had been 
slaughtered, scalped and mutilated during an attack on their village”.76 This 
happened around 1325 CE. Mostly tribes needed women from other tribes to 
maintain a genetically healthy population, most conflicts were therefore about 
abduction of women.77 Although the total number of killed people in the wars 
of the twentieth century was about 150 million, there would have been ‘more 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 95. 
76 L.H. Keeley, War before Civilization, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 38. 
77 Ibid., p. 83-87. 
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than 2 billion war deaths since 1900’ if one applied tribal death rate.78 Keeley 
concludes ‘the only practical prospect for universal peace must be more 
civilisation, not less.’79 The disadvantage of a high death rate and a shortage 
of women can diminish when groups are integrated and stabilized in bigger 
societies where law and order rule. For instance, in the Netherlands in the 15th 
century 35 murders per 100,000 people were committed annually. In the 
1970s this was one per 100,000.80 It looks like people are more secure in a 
stable society with law and order, where people follow the rules and free 
riders are punished. When rape and other kinds of violent behaviour are 
undesirable in a stable society, people will generally take action against such 
behaviour. A society where there is a law against rape can grow and the genes 
of the individuals that participate in it can prosper. Similarly, stable molecules 
that replicate will prosper in a stable DNA, in a stable chemical system in 
which proteins can line up to create a stable organism. Those stable organisms 
will prosper in stable groups and societies. Genes as generators indirectly 
cause stable societies to flourish. In a stable society, people are better able to 
provide food and to defend themselves against intruders. Free riders are 
punished and people know what to expect. Reciprocity is more likely: people 
will feel it is their duty to help fellow members of society. Not that the legal 
system evolves because of natural selection, so that genes will be selected that 
cause legal systems to occur. People will unconsciously favour rules that are 
congruous to proto-moral. Thus proto-moral will be recognized in law 
systems. Law systems make it possible that the trible morals are enhanced so 
that they can work in a complex society. Still, these law systems will have 
according characteristics. The law will in this way favour the genes of 
civilians, just as proto-moral favours the survival of the genes of group 
members. 
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In a society where everyone who cooperates benefits, we ought to behave in a 
reciprocal way to spread our genes. In fact, genes programme people to 
cooperate. The necessity to cooperate, will make people feel they ought to 
cooperate.81 As Hume already noted, our sense of duty follows the common 
and natural course of our passions.82 Law will take shape by our joint 
unconscious effort. In law, our feelings of how one ought to behave will be 
projected. Our own interests cause these feelings, but at the same time, we 
realize law and order offer us many benefits. Certainly, ancient genetic 
mechanisms have been precipitated in law, intermediated by our feelings and 
unconscious thoughts. There is a pragmatic reason to cooperate in a stable 
society: cooperation is in the interest of other group members on whom we 
depend. 83 Social norms can regulate even the behaviour of unrelated people in 
large groups.84 Group members sense this when they exhibit socially desirable 
behaviour, because this feeling is a projection of what is good for their genes. 
Socially undesirable conduct will trigger gossip and peer pressure to 
conform.85 Group members will engage in social censure by greeting non-
conformists coolly, by criticizing or ridiculing, or even by ejecting them from 
the group.86 On the other hand, people that promote morals and social 
harmony will find it easier to form beneficial relationships because their 
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reputation is good. In addition, being good in the eyes of fellow group 
members pays off reproductively.87 
A large society is too big to be stabilized by morals only, so what is needed is 
a systematized and enforceable set of conduct. This system can regulate the 
actions of the members of society. If people behave in accordance with these 
rules, they will live and prosper. When people comply with the legal system, 
society will become more stable and its members will feel there is ‘justice’. 
Legal rules within society develop because bigger groups cannot be stable 
without these rules. People form rules to stabilize society, because a stable 
society will improve their chances of survival and reproduction. Rules 
minimize tensions between group members. The rules are more or less formed 
unconsciously in a historical process and periodically rationalized and written 
down. A predisposition towards group morals and group rules may imply a 
predisposition towards a legal system (cf. the Third Law as defined above). 
With systems of law, we can build societies that are much bigger and 
complex. This success is ultimately based on a number of genes that as 
generators have made it possible for humans to imitate, to be empathic, to 
evolve morals from feelings and to punish in an altruistic way. In a stable 
society, we relinquish a portion of our freedom of reproductive choice in order 
to suppress free riders and enable the cooperation of millions of people. In this 
way, we still advance our genetic cause. To put it differently, genes (and 
genes that combine with them) that make it possible to build moral systems 
have an advantage over genes that do not.88 People without such a system, are 
at a disadvantage and will fall prey to natural selection.89 Therefore, when we 
say that we ought to obey the law, we are essentially saying that it is an 
evolutionary fact that if we obey the law, our society will be stable and the 
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chances for our genes to prosper will improve.90 Does this mean law has 
evolved by natural selection? No! Law systems are the precipitation of proto-
morals. Proto-moral has evolved in millions of years by natural selection. Just 
law will therefore prescribe how people ought to act to live in a stable group, 
in accordance to biologic mechanisms.  
This reasoning can be formulated as the Fifth Law of Evolutionary Genetics 
and Law. 
 
Law systems are the precipitation of unconscious proto-morals. Law is in this 
way effectively a consequence of some genes that at least most of us have. 
Warranting reciprocity will be an important aspect of law.  
 
Law as a consequence of stable, replicating and cooperating molecules 
 
Norms and legal rules are only useful when they are observed by the good 
majority of the population and are enforced on those that do not comply.91 The 
people must be satisfied that any sanction imposed is just so that they feel free 
riding is not a profitable strategy.92 Although the interaction between 
genotype and environment is complex and non-linear, it is reasonable to 
assume that people are predisposed towards stable societies that offer security. 
We still do not know the details of what makes people exhibit free-rider 
behaviour. We do know that a stable society that suppresses these free riders 
will enable people (and their genes) to prosper. Our genes make us pursue a 
stable society, and that pursuit therefore gives us joy. As Levy puts it, 
‘evolutionary psychology thus seems to have policy implications: we should 
encourage people to pursue the lives for which they are evolved.’93 For us 
humans this means that we should aspire to social lifestyles, which includes 
observing legal regulations, because law makes it possible to live in a 
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complex society. Spellbound by our genes, we cannot help but think in this 
way. Dunn for instance, found that even children aged 16 and 36 months 
spontaneously offered to share in order to win the approval of their family.94 
Before they can talk, children offer food to establish friendly relations.95 
Children even teach each other moral rules.96 The mere discovery of how 
ethics evolve will not prompt people to act much differently. The normative 
demand is not an illusion, but as much a reality as facts are.97 We have to act 
in accordance with group rules, because if we do not we will be exiled and 
possibly die. We certainly will feel unhappy. Sympathy for non-kin is also a 
disposition to secure the nurturance of children for the long period that is 
needed to let the brain fully develop.98 Group moral helped humans to survive 
for at least a million years. Therefore, there have to be some moral principles, 
which are universal and are part of human nature in a way men cannot ignore 
them.99 Discovering that the origin of our ethical striving has been 
programmed by groups to let group members work in favour of the group, 
probably will not cause us to reject these universal morals. If the clownfish 
were to discover that its dwelling among the tentacles of anemones protects it 
against predators, it would probably not stop helping the anemones: the 
anemone’s stings offer the clownfish effective protection.100 We tend to 
dislike people that do not abide by the rules, because we feel that they are 
taking advantage of our cooperativeness. Therefore, murderers, thieves and 
rapists have to be punished. Not because there is an idealistic rule that comes 
to us from a spiritual, dualistic world, but because our genes as generators – 
indirectly and metaphorically - tell us so. Hare states that the discovery of the 
genetic origin of normative demands undercuts that demand. People would 
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think about a way to escape those group demands that are not in their benefit. 
If the normative demand is an illusion, produced by our genes, people would 
be less inclined to be helpful to others. ‘A normative theory should be able to 
make public what it claims as the source of origin of the normative demand, 
without thereby undercutting the demand.’ 101 However, human genes cannot 
survive without humans that are helpful and cooperative. The normative 
demand is no illusion and to the benefit of groups and group members. Just as 
on the molecular level genes depend on each other, individuals depend on 
each other. Only groups that successfully inhibit free riders will be stable 
enough to survive. The trait to punish free riders will therefore be as strong as 
the trait to free ride. The trait to cooperate will be as important as the trait to 
care for oneself. 
 
The Sixth Provisional Law of Evolutionary Genetics and Law can now be 
formulated as follows: 
 
Genes are stable, replicating and cooperating molecules. Genes effectively 
are the original cause of biological stable systems. They will prosper in a 
stable, reciprocal environment. 
 
Individual sacrifice to the benefit of group stability 
 
Genes prosper in stable organisms and in stable groups. This implies a tension 
between the benefit of the individual and the group. Alexander remarks a 
constant tension between individuals that strive for maximum benefit within 
their group. Membership yields safety and extra resources, but ‘group living 
cannot be expected to last and be elaborated unless it leads to increased 
reproductive success among all participants’.102 As Richerson and Boyd put it, 
‘[w]e have evolutionary debts to individual autonomy, family, and tribe that 
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must be paid.’103 In some cases however, the individual will – has to? - 
sacrifice itself for the benefit of group stability because stability is more 
important in the long run. For instance, if our genes tell us not to accept rape, 
why have 12% of Dutch women been raped?104 One explanation could be that 
in the past women (and men) did not stand up to rapists in their direct 
neighbourhood so as not to disturb the stability of the group. They condoned 
rape in the interest of the group, thereby effectively submitting to male 
domination (as, e.g., in male-led worship). Yet, by acknowledging men’s 
power, women also made men more inclined to invest in family and society, 
the mightiest of men even without fathering children themselves.105 Because 
women will find it easier to stand up against men that do not take part in 
society, they will easier admit they were raped by sexually dispossessed men, 
than by mighty group members. These men of lower status can easily be 
exposed without endangering the stability of society. It is actually easier to 
recognize coercive sex with these men as rape. It is more difficult to accept 
that rape is something that, under the wrong circumstances, most men are 
capable of. Civilized men do not do such things. Indeed, civilized men - men 
that participate in and defend their stable society - should not, and therefore 
mostly will not, do such things. They have too much to lose. They also benefit 
from a safe, stable society without free riders. On the other hand, as Martin 
shows, women will subjectively experience men with resources as more 
sexually desirable. This implies that women under certain circumstances are 
more likely to find men attractive who dominate them.106 This also explains 
why Thornhill and Palmer found that women raped by attractive men 
inadvertently experienced ‘sexual arousal’.107 It will be easier for a dominant 
man to do things that women do not want. Rape by an attractive man can stir 
ambivalent feelings in his victim. Dominant men are attractive, but rape is not. 
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This ambivalent reaction can trigger feelings of guilt. From an evolutionary 
point of view, it is not clear if rape by a healthy, strong man is an advantage. 
The offspring probably will be more successful than if the father would be 
weak and of lower status. 
 
For rapists, on the other hand, there can be a significant evolutionary 
advantage. Of the women that were raped in the Netherlands 6.9% became 
pregnant,108 which from a clinical perspective is a significantly reproductive 
benefit.109 If this were a net benefit, not outweighed by costs, rape as a 
reproductive strategy would increase rapidly. It is therefore likely that rape 
will continue (and even increase) in situations where the male unconscious 
will estimate the costs to be low. In a stable, male-led society, a system of 
control, honour, law, coercion and punishment has to keep men ‘civilized’. 
Law as a precipitation of what we feel as evolutionary advantageous will 
support to this ‘civilisation’. However, this system does not come from the 
outside, it grows within communities because the genes that benefit from a 
stable society - where free riders will face high costs – indirectly will cause it 
to evolve. When individual group members act as free riders, the other group 
members will experience this behaviour as unjust. They will take action to 
restore the balance. They will punish the free riders and overwhelm the 
benefits of the free rider behaviour.110 
 
This reasoning leads to the seventh and final Provisional Law of Evolutionary 
Genetics and Law. 
 
The tendency for group stability causes individuals to sacrifice some of their 
benefits. Law can help to keep a balance between the individual’s interests 
and the group’s interests. This balance is experienced as justice. 
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110 Boyd and Richerson 1992, supra note 76. 
 29 
 
What law can learn from 7 million years of evolution 
 
The question Leiter and Weisberg ask is why should law care how 
behavioural traits evolved, where most biological literature is not about 
humans at all? One of the answers to this question is that humans share many 
genes with animals. The genetic difference between humans and other animal 
species is not as big as is sometimes suggested. As Moss points out, we share 
more than 98% of our genes with other primates. Moreover, we only have 
30,000 of them, around the same number as mice. What is more, a 
considerable amount of genes, the so-called Hox genes, we share with fruit 
flies. Presumably, these genes are responsible for the development and 
integration of essential body components.111 However, not only body 
components have strong genetic origins. The moral community is a human 
universal, that is also found among all great apes. It seems necessary to have 
morals to keep a group of aggressive individuals working together.112 
According to Lorenz, aggressive instincts needed inhibitions to keep 
aggression under control. Apes help others to stop fighting, probably because 
of their empathic capacities.113 Apes probably feel that if another ape can be 
hurt, they themselves can be hurt, so they have to help the ape that is being 
hurt. However, morals among apes are poorly communicated.114 In gorilla 
troops, intervention generally consists of a ‘pig grunt’ or a physical action 
from the silverback.115 Bonobos have a variety of reconciliatory techniques, 
most of which include sex.116 Chimpanzee males shout at each other but 
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seldom hurt group members. After about ten minutes of screaming, they 
reconcile by stretching out a hand.117 When reconciliation fails, an older 
female will mediate by physically joining their hands.118 A female will go to a 
dominant male for help if other females threaten her infants.119 Considering 
the different characteristics of different species of apes and humans, will make 
it possible to recognize what factors are important factors in human law. As I 
showed, bonobo law systems would be different from human law systems. 
This is because the law is a precipitation of biological predispositions. 
Language enabled humans to resolve conflicts by means of communication.120 
Using language, humans could communicate morals and instruct children and 
other group members in them, and a moral system could evolve. Although 
evolution took place in small groups, the mechanism of a moral system also 
works in large societies in which underlying morals are translated in rules that 
can be communicated more easily.121 The disposition to use morals and 
language made it possible to build large societies, but language also improved 
cheating skills.122 The temptation to solely go for individual genetic 
furtherance humans share with all other organisms, and as humans also share 
most of their genes with those organisms this temptation cannot be ignored.123 
This temptation is the main driving force of evolution. On the other hand, 
morals are essential for human society. Evolutionary biology can help legal 
regulation by emphasizing that intervention by strong – or wise – group 
members is vital to our society. If some prefer the pursuit of individual gain, 
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we should remind them of the 7 million years of evolution in which morals 
have proven their benefits to our ancestors and our species as a whole. 
In short, by studying the genetic and biologic foundation of law, we will 
improve our understanding of law systems. This will eventually lead to 
efficient law systems that support societies in which people feel happy, 




Leiter and Weisberg venture that the fascination with ‘law and evolutionary 
biology’ is probably caused by ‘various hobby horses of the right: people are 
‘selfish’, law can’t change everything, nature puts limits on utopian 
aspirations, and the like’. However, do these statements adequately reflect 
what modern evolutionary biology tells us? I do not think so. They are bold 
statements that can be refuted with recent knowledge. Law was not introduced 
by some extraterrestrial powers to civilize selfish humans and to restrain some 
of their more unruly biological inclinations: it is a product of evolutionary 
processes. Maybe law cannot change everything, but it certainly has changed 
much to the benefit of our genes and therefore to the benefit of ourselves. On 
the other hand, law is a precipitation of proto-morals. Justice will therefore 
never be found if our biological needs are not met.  
 
Genes as generators can have different effects in different environments, so 
the traits that are made possible by these genes can also be different. The crux 
lies in the mechanisms driving evolutionary genetics. They can help us discern 
basic patterns of human behaviour and social evolution. In addition, properties 
of genes can predict how people will tend to behave. In a society where 
everyone who cooperates benefits, we ought to behave in a reciprocal way to 
spread our genes. Genes effectively program people to cooperate; they feel 
they ought to cooperate. When behaviour is considered socially undesirable, it 
is probably not to the genetic advantage of the group members. Law, exposure 
and punishment can diminish deviant behaviour, because such a response 
generally puts the perpetrator at a genetic disadvantage. Law systems are a 
precipitation of the mechanism. Stable, replicating and reciprocal molecules 
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are the ultimate cause of stable systems. They will prosper in a stable DNA, in 
stable organisms and in stable groups and societies. Thus, law systems that 
stabilize society are in essence an extended phenotype of those genes. They 
warrant reciprocity in complex societies. Reciprocity that itself can be seen as 
a generator that in a fractal like way causes reciprocal relations at all 
biological levels. In addition, people can be argued to be at least as altruistic 
as they often considered to be selfish, because they tend to form stable 
societies all or at least most of whose members prosper. However, it is 
probably more accurate to state that people depend on each other. Members 
that strive to reproduce themselves, but that also cannot live without one 
another. In this respect, the pattern is no different at the level of the gene, the 
cell, the organism or the group. Law has been and still is a vehicle of change 
and it has helped genes that facilitated its rise prosper. Nevertheless, nature 
also puts limits on utopian aspirations. Although humans tend to form stable 
societies, there will always be the temptation of free riding. People flourish on 
law and order, but if a tempting opportunity arises, they may try to seize it. 
Just like genes also compete to one another. In order to maintain a social, 
reciprocal equilibrium, those that cannot resist this temptation should be kept 
in line, so that the benefits of transgressing are outweighed by its costs. Law 
as a precipitation of these mechanisms will support this equilibrium. 
 
By recognizing genes as a conditio sine qua non for law, as generators that are 
indispensable for the development of law, it will be easier to integrate law, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and biology. This will help to study law 
in a more empirical way without reducing law to biological facts, because that 
cannot be done. Interaction between humans, interaction of humans with their 
environment and interaction between ideas is also necessary for law to evolve. 
Nonetheless, the study of evolutionary genetics will improve our 
understanding of law. No scientist or philosopher will idly wait until there is 
enough material to think about. Theories, including the speculative and 
contentious ones, can help us interpret and understand new scientific facts. 
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